 On September 12, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that it is investing in $238 million worth of environmentally sustainable projects to improve water and waste infrastructure across the country and in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (1). This investment, which will further develop drinking water and waste disposal systems for communities with fewer than 10,000 residents, is the latest manifestation of the USDA’s commitment to energy and resource solutions in rural communities during Barack Obama’s presidency. Programs encompass far more than just agricultural issues; many now attempt to address the difficulties rural communities face in reducing emissions while sustaining economic development .
The Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) is one such USDA initiative that bolsters rural economies while also promoting sustainability. REAP offers small businesses and farms, which often cannot afford the latest technology, the opportunity to invest in renewable energy systems or energy-efficient equipment upgrades (2). The program delivers funding through grants, which can cover up to twenty-five percent of the project cost, and loan guarantees, which can cover up to seventy-five percent of the project cost (3); since 2009, REAP has provided over $775 million in aid (4). To date, over 15,000 small businesses and family farms across the country have invested in clean energy thanks to this program. Projects like REAP have reduced the greenhouse emissions of these rural industries by more than 5 million metric tons per year, which is comparable to removing a million cars from the road annually (5). The endeavors supported by REAP appeal to farmers and small business owners because they are both financially and environmentally beneficial. REAP-sponsored renewable energy projects range from solar-powered wineries to geothermal greenhouses to energy-efficient irrigation systems. Wind turbines and biomass also continue to successfully generate large amounts of electricity. Without funding, these green technologies can be prohibitively expensive to purchase, but once implemented, they reduce energy costs significantly. These projects also provide an important boost to small-town economies, making them more attractive to the younger people who are otherwise fleeing to cities. Though REAP has received little attention in national press, it is incredibly popular: Demand for clean energy investment aid has outweighed supply for several years, and in 2015, REAP had to reject almost 1,000 applications for lack of funding (6). Last year’s transition to a more accessible online application also caused applicant numbers to skyrocket. As of 2014, only nineteen percent of the American population resided in rural spaces; these spaces account for ninety-five percent of the total U.S. land area, yet rural populations continue to decrease (7). Rural areas are ideal sites for clean energy production because the renewable resources necessary to generate electricity are usually abundant and readily available. The Great Plains states, for example, have ample wind and biomass resources, while Southwestern and Western states are typically rich in solar and geothermal resources (8). However, rural areas are also simultaneously more vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. Many communities face threats to their livelihoods and lifestyles from global warming, extreme weather events, and environmental changes that are already accompanying climate shifts (9). REAP and other USDA initiatives help to revitalize rural economies, improve quality of life for community residents, and transition the U.S. towards clean energy consumption. When Obama took office in 2009, he pledged to harness renewable energy to help power the U.S. and significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions; programs like REAP represent some of his greatest steps towards achieving these goals. (1) "USDA Announces Rural Water and Waste Infrastructure Investments." USDA Announces Rural Water and Waste Infrastructure Investments. September 12, 2016. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2016/09/0193.xml. (2) Platt, John R. "Rural America's New Cash Crop: Renewable Energy." TakePart. September 12, 2016. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/09/12/agriculture-helps-drive-rural-renewable-energy-use. (3) "Rural Energy for America Program Renewable Energy Systems & Energy Efficiency Improvement Loans & Grants." USDA Rural Development. 2016. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://www.rd.usda.gov/programs-services/rural-energy-america-program-renewable-energy-systems-energy-efficiency. (4) Platt, John R. "Rural America's New Cash Crop: Renewable Energy." TakePart. September 12, 2016. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/09/12/agriculture-helps-drive-rural-renewable-energy-use. (5) Ibid. (6) Ibid. (7) "National Climate Assessment." National Climate Assessment. 2014. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/regions/rural-communities. (8) USA. USDA. Office of Energy Policy and News Uses. Renewable Power Opportunities for Rural Communities. April 2011. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://www.usda.gov/oce/reports/energy/RenewablePowerOpportunities-Final.pdf. (9) "National Climate Assessment." National Climate Assessment. 2014. Accessed September 28, 2016. http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/regions/rural-communities. Image: © Juan Carlos Fariñas Peinado | Dreamstime.com - Puerto Rico Flag in a ship, in La Parguera
0 Comments
 The suspected Russian attack on a humanitarian aid convoy and the bombings over Aleppo, accompanying the Syrian military’s announcement of the cease-fire’s end on September 19, confirmed that a solution to the political and humanitarian crisis in Syria is nowhere in sight. The American and Russian- sponsored truce was supposed to function as a confidence-building measure for the success of both a future political transition for Syria and future cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. However, tensions have only heightened in the region. These and other recent events indicate that the turmoil in Syria is increasingly becoming a stage on which global and regional tensions play out.
The conflict between the supporters of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad and the rebels who oppose him is at the heart of Syria’s civil war: opposition to Assad catalyzed the civil war, and the brutalities of his regime and its foreign supporters have perpetuated it. Assad is internationally recognized as a brutal leader who violently forces his people into submission. He has employed starvation and chemical weapons against civilians to hurt rebel forces, the most notable example of which is the 2013 sarin gas attack carried out by his regime, which killed roughly 1,400 civilians in the Ghouta area (1). According to the Syrian American Medical Society, 161 documented chemical attacks have occurred in Syria from the beginning of the insurgency through 2015, primarily by the Assad regime (2). The most recent of these took place on September 6, when an attack in Aleppo targeted civilians with chlorine gas explosives in territory held by rebel groups (3). These attacks not only sow widespread terror amongst civilians but also have the potential to create an international norm condoning the use of chemical weapons. For these and other humanitarian reasons, many global powers have condemned Assad and his regime. Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah are the exceptions to this rule, providing political and military support to ensure Assad stays in power. In some ways, Assad’s grip on Syria has weakened, as he now controls less than half of Syria’s territory and his military forces are depleted. In other words, the unrest in Syria is strengthening his command. When compared to jihadist organizations like ISIS and the new Al Qaeda-affiliated Levant Conquest Front, Assad appears to be a lesser evil that poses no direct threat to the Western world. Recent actions by anti-Assad states support this perception: The US has stopped calling for his removal from a position of authority, and in August, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced that his country is willing to accept a role for Assad during present and transitional periods of instability (4). Assad likewise continues to succeed because his opponents are divided among foreign powers, terrorist groups, and religious and ethnic lines. Iran views Syria as essential to its regional strategy because Syria provides access to Hezbollah, which counterbalances Israel’s nuclear weapons. Iran was the first state to send soldiers and supplies to back Assad. Russia has likewise propped up Assad from the beginning of the conflict, vouching for him at the United Nations and supplying weapons to his regime (5). Syria is one of Russia’s few remaining allies, but more importantly, the country presents an opportunity for Russia to compete with Western dominance in the Middle East. Russia and Iran’s shared interest in Syria and Assad’s regime has resulted in unparalleled military cooperation between the two countries. The extent of this relationship was revealed last month when Russia bombed targets in Syria using an Iranian air base (6). Previously, only America and its allies were able to use bases in a Middle Eastern country to strike targets in another, and some Iranian commanders have now suggested that Iran and Russia will conduct joint naval exercises and have use of Iranian naval bases in the Persian Gulf (7). Over the course of the Syrian civil war, Russia and Iran have coordinated military planning and combined intelligence. Russia has even supplied advanced missiles to Iran. The two states’ resentment toward U.S. dominance and its attempts to impede their ambitions provide plenty incentive for collaboration in this arena. Rivalries between Iran and the Arab states that border it further drive Iran to strengthen its ties with Russia. However, as long as a victory in Syria remains elusive for either side, Iran and Russia will not receive the economic lift or international acceptance they both desire. Though both countries admitted the agreement was not based on trust, the U.S. and Russian-brokered ceasefire presented significant opportunity for military cooperation between the former Cold War enemies. The ceasefire negotiations arose during a time when relations between the U.S. and Russia are especially strained; it was only possible because the two states support, and thus have influence over, opposite sides of the Syrian conflict. Following the US airstrikes on September 17 that were intended to target ISIS forces but instead killed over sixty Syrian troops, the Syrian military declared an end to the ceasefire. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry contested this declaration, saying “We need to see what the Russians say” before any official decision regarding the ceasefire is made (8). “The important thing,” Kerry continued, “is the Russians need to control Assad” (9). However, the odds that the agreement can be salvaged are slim. The probable failure of the ceasefire has severe consequences for Syrians in desperate need of humanitarian aid. It also indicates that the eventual collaboration between Russia and the U.S. against ISIS and other terrorist organization desired by the ceasefire negotiators is unlikely, and that U.S.-Russian relations will remain strained for the present. Above all, the termination of the ceasefire highlights the complexity of and obstacles to resolving the Syrian conflict, which at present has no foreseeable conclusion. (1) Malso, Jared. "Assad's Regime Is Still Using Chemical Weapons in Syria." Time. September 14, 2016. Accessed September 16, 2016. http://time.com/4492670/syria-chemical-weapon-aleppo-assad-regime/. (2) Ibid. (3) Ibid. (4) Wieting, Ayse. "Turkey: Assad Can Be Part of Transition in Syria." The Big Story. August 20, 2016. Accessed September 19, 2016. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ef6fa94895854d96abb111ccc11986d0/turkey-assad-can-be-part-transition-syria. (5) Fisher, Max. "Straightforward Answers to Basic Questions About Syria’s War." The New York Times. September 18, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/world/middleeast/syria-civil-war-bashar-al-assad-refugees-islamic-state.html?rref=collection/timestopic/Assad, Bashar al-. (6) Nasr, Vali R. "A Russian-Iranian Axis." The New York Times. September 16, 2016. Accessed September 19, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/opinion/a-russian-iranian-axis.html. (7) Ibid. (8) DeYoung, Karen, and Erin Cunningham. "Syria's 7-day Grace Period Ends with No Aid and Cease-fire in Tatters." Washington Post. September 19, 2016. Accessed September 19, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-7-day-grace-period-ends-with-no-aid-and-cease-fire-in-tatters/2016/09/19/633ecd72-7dea-11e6-ad0e-ab0d12c779b1_story.html. (9) Ibid. Image: © Rkaphotography | Dreamstime.com - President Assad And The Ruins Of Apemea, Syria Photo Turkey Post-Coup Attempt: Authoritarian Orders, Strained Foreign Relations, and a New Identity9/14/2016 In a move contradicting its policy and investments of the last several months, Japan took a symbolic step back from Iran when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe postponed his visit to the country in late July. The visit, for which plans had been in place since March of this year, was intended to strengthen economic ties between Japan and Iran. It would have marked a diplomatic milestone; if Abe had taken the trip in August as he was scheduled to, he would have been the first Japanese leader to set foot in Iran since 1978 (1).
Japan’s energy-oriented relations with Iran have long been influenced by the U.S., a key ally that severed diplomatic ties with Iran for decades, first because Washington disapproved of the 1979 revolution that toppled the pro-Western monarchy, more recently because of tensions related to Iran’s nuclear weapons program and involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. Nonetheless, Japan took steps to maintain bilateral relations with the Shi’ite country and remained on good terms with Iran until 2006, when the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to halt its uranium enrichment program (2). These sanctions, along with crippling international sanctions imposed by the U.S., the E.U, and Japan, among others, were lifted in January following the historic 2015 agreement negotiated by the P5+1 group (China, France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S., plus Germany) that effectively put an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Iran boasts the world’s largest natural gas reserves, fourth-largest oil reserves, and 78 million potential consumers (3), and Japan is eager to get ahead in the global rush to establish footholds in the Iranian market that ensued immediately after the lifting of the sanctions. Prior to 2006, Iran was one of Japan’s primary sources of foreign energy, and the island state only stopped importing Iranian oil when the Obama administration increased pressure on its allies to comply with the sanctions regime in 2012 (4). Tokyo’s energy needs have only intensified after its four-year voluntary nuclear moratorium, a consequence of the 2011 nuclear crisis at Fukushima; at the time of the ban, nuclear energy supplied almost a third of Tokyo’s domestic energy (5). In mid-February, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and Iran signed a bilateral pact that promised to give Japanese countries an edge in investing in the resource-rich nation, and Tokyo soon after announced a business facilitation mechanism that will invest $10 billion in different sectors of the Iranian economy (6). These actions are clearly indicative of Japan’s strong desire to resume business with Iran and diversify its dependence on foreign oil imports. So why would Abe postpone his meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and risk sending signals of reluctance or hesitation, when his country and its businessmen have so much to gain from close economic ties with Iran? Donald Trump. If the visit does happen, it will likely not occur until after the November U.S. presidential election, when Japan can finally be certain who is calling the shots for its favorite ally. Over the course of his campaign, the anti-establishment and now-official GOP nominee has expressed a number of anti-Japanese sentiments, including resentment toward the fact that Japan relies on America for military protection, disgust with the Trans-Pacific Partnership that benefits Japan, and a proposal for sky-high tariffs on Japanese cars sold in the U.S., and he has even gone so far as to hint at ending the Japanese-American alliance. Any foreign policy expert would be happy to explain that this alliance is of great importance to Washington, and that as host to 50,000 U.S. troops, Japan plays a vital role in the U.S.’s “rebalance” of its economic and security focus to the Asia-Pacific region (7). It is not unlikely that if Trump were to win the election, he would rely on the advice of experienced and rational foreign policy experts, and therefore steer clear of outlandish, almost universally recognized as foolish policy decisions, such as the ones mentioned above. However, his blustering remarks and belligerent behavior are so inconsistent that Trump remains a huge wildcard, leaving other countries such as Japan unable to confidently predict what foreign policy he would pursue and what actions he would take internationally. As Hillary Clinton and Trump remain uncomfortably close in voter polls and the possibility of a Trump-presidency seems more and more like a potential reality, Japan cannot be certain what kind of leader it will face in the Oval Office. And because Clinton has extensive foreign policy experience and spearheaded the rebalancing toward Asia as Secretary of State during Obama’s first term, it stands to reason that Japan and other Asian countries prefer a Clinton administration. As such, Japan seems unwilling to enact strategic decisions with major global implications before November 2016, with economic activity in Iran being chief among them. The U.S. and Iran have long had strained, if not outright hostile, relations, and though these appear to be improving in recent months with the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal, much tension still exists between the two states. Though Clinton supports the deal, Trump has actually condemned it, calling it “disastrous” and saying it would be one of the first agreements he would re-negotiate if he assumes office, in an interview with The Washington Post. The next U.S. president could re-impose sanctions against Iran that would cause trouble for companies doing business there, which may be why Japan wishes to stall its pursuits in the Iranian economy. Tokyo is likely also exercising greater caution to avoid offending the U.S. in its dealings with Iran, an outcome which could have dire consequences for the Asian country if transpiring under a volatile Trump administration. Because the U.S. is such a powerful player on the global stage, Japan will not be the only country to reevaluate its foreign policy when facing the prospect of a fickle Trump presidency. His confirmation as the official GOP nominee in July provided a reality-check to any observers who still hopefully denied the legitimacy of his campaign, and countries everywhere must take steps to prepare for the possibility of Trump in office. Onlookers can expect to see many other foreign policy decisions put on hold until after the November elections, when the world will finally learn who steers the American ship for the next four years. (1) "Japan's Abe Looks to Visit Iran This Year." March 7, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016. http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-s-Abe-looks-to-visit-Iran-this-year. (2) “Sanctions eased but Japan Inc. treads warily in return to Iran | The Japan Times.” Japan Times RSS. March 16, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016. (3) "Japan's Abe Looks to Visit Iran This Year." March 7, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016. http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-s-Abe-looks-to-visit-Iran-this-year. (4) Berkshire Miller, Jonathan. “Japan’s Strategic Ties with Iran.” Aljazeera Centre for Studies. February 18, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016. (5) Ibid. (6) Obe, Mitsuru. "Japan Set to Resume Business With Iran." WSJ. February 5, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-set-to-resume-business-with-iran-1454654121. (7) Pennington, Matthew. “Trump’s Positions on Trade, Security Alliances Could Roil U.S.-Asia Ties.” Haaretz. March 10, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016. Image: © Bigapplestock | Dreamstime.com - <a href="https://www.dreamstime.com/royalty-free-stock-photography-japan-united-states-flags-midtown-manhattan-two-allies-embarked-trade-pact-talks-april-president-obama-image39850167#res14972580">Japan and the United States</a> The body of environmental and indigenous activist Lesbia Yaneth Urquía was discovered on July 6, outside a dump in the town of Marcala, Honduras. Urquía, 49, was working to halt the construction of a hydroelectric dam in the municipality of San José, La Paz, and had been an active member of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (1). Her murder is only the most recent in a string of killings of environmental activists in the country. Four months earlier, the high-profile assassination of her colleague Berta Cáceres, 45, cofounder of COPINH and recipient of the prestigious 2015 Goldman Environmental Prize, sparked international outrage over the targeting of activists who oppose megaprojects and resource extraction in Central America. (2)
In a statement released on July 7, Honduran judicial officials said that Urquia had suffered a severe head injury and that a possible motive for her murder was “the supposed robbery of her professional bicycle,” which she was planning to ride before her disappearance (3). A week later, Jorge Galindo, a spokesman for the attorney general’s office, said “three men suspected of the crime have been arrested, including a brother-in-law of the deceased” (4). According to Galindo, Manuel Lopez, the brother-in-law, had threatened to kill Urquía over a family property dispute and was suspected of hiring two other men to execute the crime (5). A statement issued by COPINH directly contradicts these official accounts and labeled the death of Urquía “an act of political feminicide” and “confirmation that a plan has been set into motion to do away with those who are defending nature and the commons” (6). COPINH held Gladys Aurora López, current Vice President of the Honduran Congress for the ruling Nationalist party, and her husband Arnold Castro, owner of Los Encinos S.A. dam company, responsible for Urquía’s assassination, calling them “a permanent source of threats and conflicts deriving from the hydroelectric construction projects” in La Paz (7). Castro and his company stand to profit from the energy that Aurora I, the dam Urquía fought against, would generate, and the Honduran government’s reluctance to connect Urquía’s death to her activism seems to indicate a conflict of interest that renders it unable to conduct an unbiased and just investigation. In June, The Guardian published claims made by a former soldier who said that Cáceres, along with dozens of other activists, appeared on a hit list distributed to special forces units of the Honduran military in the months before her death. Honduran officials denied these allegations (8). Cáceres received repeated death threats related to her work, which most recently focused on fighting the construction of Agua Zarca, a proposed hydroelectric dam project which was to be built on the Gualcarque River in the territory of the indigenous Lenca people. These threats were serious enough to prompt the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to call on the Honduran government to provide her with protection, which never materialized (9). Global Witness, an international NGO that works to expose natural resource exploitation and human rights abuses, named Honduras as the most dangerous country per capita for environmental activists in the last five years, with 101 deaths taking place between 2010 and 2014 (10). However, this crisis is not unique to Honduras; environmental activists are being murdered worldwide, with the problem being especially acute in Latin America and Asia-Pacific. According to Global Witness’s report Deadly Environment, which was updated in January 2016, “on average two people are killed every week defending their land, forests and waterways against the expansion of large-scale agriculture, dams, mining, logging and other threats” (11). 2015 became the deadliest year on record for environmental activists, as at least 185 people were killed in what is nearly a 60% increase on the previous year (12). But even these figures are likely greatly underestimated: many environmental defender deaths go unnoticed because of a lack of public records, and there is also significant under-reporting in countries like Myanmar and China, where human rights monitoring is prohibited or restricted (13). This death toll is rising in tandem with increased pressure on natural resources and demand for commodities like timber, beef, and palm oil (14). As the global economy expands its reach into previously inaccessible rural and unindustrialized areas, large corporations and governments of developing countries are choosing to meet the demands of the growing human population through methods that are convenient rather than sustainable, especially in areas with long histories of corruption and exploitation. This creates both higher need and higher stakes for environmental activists. Indigenous populations are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, especially since action in their communities can escalate before their stories receive national or international attention. “Most repression—by the state or wealthy private-sector interests—targets campesino and indigenous communities defending their lands, lives, and environment,” says Grahame Russell of the US- and Canada-based NGO Rights Action (15). Forty percent of activist victims in 2014 were indigenous, with most people dying amid disputes over hydropower, mining, and agribusiness (16). The majority of these people are grass-roots leaders who “become involved because they’re fighting for what’s being taken away from their communities,” says Jane Cohen, an expert in environmental health at Human Rights Watch in New York City (17). According to Billy Kyte, senior campaigner for Global Witness and author of its 2015 report, “Communities that take a stand are increasingly finding themselves in the firing line of companies’ private security, state forces and a thriving market for contract killers” (18). Honduras became significantly more hospitable to such killers after the 2009 coup d’état that replaced Manuel Zelaya with Roberto Michelietti as president. Zelaya’s administration had introduced moderate land reforms and had successfully blocked many hydroelectric projects, but not only did the coup create a political atmosphere of terror and instability conducive to environmental crime, the new government approved forty contracts for a series of dams in June of 2010 (19). This mentality has been perpetuated by current President Juan Orlando Hernández, whose rallying cry coming into office in 2013 was “Honduras Is Open for Business.” In January of 2015, the Honduran government announced its plans to grant rulings on environmental feasibility within twenty-four hours and similarly expedite granting environmental permits in order to encourage development (20). These actions, along with the government’s nonexistent reactions to the murders of Urquía and Cáceres, are representative of the ongoing preference of Honduras—as well as Latin America and the world as a whole—to disregard human life and the natural environment in favor of profit. In its Deadly Environment report, Global Witness calls on national governments and the international community to protect the environment and the people who defend it. To stop this cycle of death and destruction, the international community will have to make its perpetrators understand that the consequences of human and environmental devastation far outweigh the monetary benefits—even if doing so must involve creating sanctions or other punishments. (1) "World Anger over Honduras Activist Lesbia Yaneth Urquia's Death." BBC News. July 10, 2016. Accessed July 27, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36756937. (2) Mackey, Danielle Marie. "Drugs, Dams, and Power: The Murder of Honduran Activist Berta Cáceres." The Intercept. March 11, 2016. Accessed July 31, 2016. (3) Agren, David. "Honduras Confirms Murder of Another Member of Berta Cáceres's Activist Group." The Guardian. July 07, 2016. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/honduras-murder-lesbia-janeth-urquia-berta-caceres. (4) "Three Held over Murder of Another Environmental Activist in Honduras." Reuters. July 13, 2016. Accessed July 31, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-honduras-crime-idUSKCN0ZT2MY. (5) Ibid. (6) "Cloc-Via Campesina Honduras Statement on Assassination of Lesbia Yaneth Urquía." Cloc-Via Campesina Honduras Statement on Assassination of Lesbia Yaneth Urquía. July 18, 2016. Accessed July 31, 2016. https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/human-rights-mainmenu-40/2098-cloc-via-campesina-honduras-statement-on-assassination-of-lesbia-yaneth-urquia. (7) Ibid. (8) Lakhani, Nina. "Berta Cáceres's Name Was on Honduran Military Hitlist, Says Former Soldier." The Guardian. June 21, 2016. Accessed July 31, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/berta-caceres-name-honduran-military-hitlist-former-soldier. (9) Mackey, Danielle Marie. "Drugs, Dams, and Power: The Murder of Honduran Activist Berta Cáceres." The Intercept. March 11, 2016. Accessed July 31, 2016. https://theintercept.com/2016/03/11/drugs-dams-and-power-the-murder-of-honduran-activist-berta-caceres/. (10) “How Many More? | Global Witness." Global Witness. 2014. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/how-many-more/. (11) "Deadly Environment | Global Witness." Global Witness. April 15, 2014. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/deadly-environment/. (12) "New Report: 2015 Sees Unprecedented Killings of Environmental Activists | Global Witness." Global Witness. June 20, 2016. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/2015-sees-unprecedented-killings-environmental-activists/. (13) "Deadly Environment | Global Witness." Global Witness. April 15, 2014. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/deadly-environment/. (14) Ibid. (15) Holmes, Oliver. "Environmental Activist Murders Set Record as 2015 Became Deadliest Year." The Guardian. June 20, 2016. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/20/environmental-activist-murders-global-witness-report. (16) "How Many More? | Global Witness." Global Witness. 2014. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/how-many-more (17) Wallace, Scott. "Why Do Environmentalists Keep Getting Killed Around the World?" Smithsonian. February 2014. Accessed July 27, 2016. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/why-do-environmentalists-keep-getting-killed-around-world-180949446/?no-ist. "Honduras: Environmental Licenses Accelerated - CentralAmericaData :: The Regional Business Portal." Honduras: Environmental Licenses Accelerated - CentralAmericaData :: The Regional Business Portal. January 7, 2015. Accessed July 31, 2016. http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Honduras_Environmental_Licenses_Accelerated. (18) Holmes, Oliver. "Environmental Activist Murders Set Record as 2015 Became Deadliest Year." The Guardian. June 20, 2016. Accessed July 27, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/20/environmental-activist-murders-global-witness-report. (19) Mackey, Danielle Marie. "Drugs, Dams, and Power: The Murder of Honduran Activist Berta Cáceres." The Intercept. March 11, 2016. Accessed July 31, 2016. https://theintercept.com/2016/03/11/drugs-dams-and-power-the-murder-of-honduran-activist-berta-caceres/. (20) "Honduras: Environmental Licenses Accelerated - CentralAmericaData :: The Regional Business Portal." Honduras: Environmental Licenses Accelerated - CentralAmericaData :: The Regional Business Portal. January 7, 2015. Accessed July 31, 2016. http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Honduras_Environmental_Licenses_Accelerated. Image: © Phototrip | Dreamstime.com - <a href="https://www.dreamstime.com/editorial-photography-honduran-national-police-patrol-providing-sense-security-awareness-truck-filled-officers-streets-saba-image50056532#res14972580">Honduran National Police on Patrol</a> |
Hanna FahsholtzWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. Archives
October 2016
Categories |
RSS Feed